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The spectacular events that shook the European Economic and Monetary Union in
the past few years have left their footprints in EU law scholarship. The State debt
crisis beginning with the announced threat of Greek default in winter 2009/2010 took
away Articles 119 to 144 TFEU from the hands of a distinguished group of experts
and incited most of EU legal scholars to take part in a vivid discussion. Maybe it is
time to consolidate now. Is this achieved by the two Tuoris’ book? With respect, the
answer is probably no.
The central statement of the book is perfectly clear. The European macro-economic
constitution is about stability, which means, in Luhmann’s terms, “a structural
coupling between economy and law.” (p. 57). Crisis has stirred up that economic
constitution so much that: “Legal improvisation and innovative constitutional
interpretations – if we are allowed a euphemism – were felt a necessity.” (p. 120).
Price stability is replaced by financial stability (p. 183), the ECB “has compromised
on price stability” (p. 186). Structural coupling is de-coupled, therefore the authors
end: “In sum, we are not very optimistic.” (p. 266).
What is most helpful and interesting to read is the plenitude of arguments against
the mainstream – well reflected legal and economic thinking which is by no means
“Eurosceptic” or even radical, but legally and also economically/politically sound
argumentation. Thus, the authors report the continuous claim that monetary union
should have been accompanied by full economic or even political union, but they
rightly point out (what is rarely done) that “… the exact meaning and manifestations
of the alleged asymmetry tend to remain unclear.” (p. 52). Further, they underline
– based on a recent IMF report – the following unpleasant reflection: “Whether a
timely Greek default would actually have reduced uncertainty and helped to sort out
the crisis quickly or whether it would have led to a catastrophe, such as the crash of
the euro, will probably remain an unresolved question, although a recent IMF report
would tend to suggest that postponing debt restructuring, led to a worsening of the
situation and increased costs of the crisis for Greece in particular.” (p. 76). Tuori and
Tuori show where the judgment in Pringle is “vulnerable to criticism” (including AG
Kokott’s opinion), viz. that it leaves aside the original creditor’s position and with it
the perspectives of moral hazard and market discipline (p. 126). And last but not
least they claim: “Yet, the Treaty is very clear in not allowing the ECB to finance
governments … Hence, mere reference to the permissibility of secondary-market
operations under Art. 123 (1) TFEU does not disperse all constitutional misgivings
surrounding ECB policy.” (pp. 165 et seq.; cf. also pp. 49, 51, 103 and 168 on top)
Hopefully, the ECJ will consider this when deliberating Case C-62/14 – let alone that
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the Tuoris also tend to detect a breach of Art. 125 (1) TFEU here, which even the
Bundesverfassungsgericht does not claim!
But is this the type of monographic analysis we currently need? Problems start
with the authors’ idea of the “many constitutions of Europe” (p. 4) – the economic,
juridical, political, security and social constitution. Is this a normative or a descriptive
concept of “constitution”? Apparently, this notion goes back to Kaarlo Tuori’s
earlier works (and, strangely enough, reminds us about earlier writings of the rather
conservative German author Rupert Scholz about “Teilverfassungen”), and it is of
course a deficit of the reviewer that he is neither familiar with that œuvre or with
Nordic Critical Legal Positivism in general, so that he feels very uncomfortable in
formulating a criticism this harsh. However, it remains unclear when reading the 266
(well written, to be sure!) pages of the book to what extent the particular underlying
constitutional theory is helpful in understanding the constitutional shift in the crisis,
e.g. the statements listed in the preceding paragraph – many of which the reviewer
would accept. The sketch of constitutional relations (p. 7): relations of sedimentation,
constitutive relations, relations of justification/criticism/limitation is not visibly taken
up in later parts of the book.
Leaving asidethis particular approach to constitutional theory, the book includes
chapters on the historical development of EMU, on the Pringle judgment, on the
shift in economic governance (all the packs, whether six- or two-) and on the
interpretation of single articles of the TFEU. Parts of the book are very informative,
such as the description of the Werner Plan which foresaw some form of economic
government (p. 23) or the explanation of important parts of the Delors report (p.
25). The differentiation between the micro-economic and the macro-economic
constitution of the Treaties (pp. 13 et seq. i.e. between the single market on the one
hand and EMU on the other hand), pointing out that changes in economics mainly
affected the latter (cf. the “secular trends”: the constant increase of public and private
debt in the developed economies, the inclusion of the emerging economies and the
decline in volatility, known as the ‘Great Moderation’, pp. 61 et seq.), is particularly
creative.
Other passages are unfortunately affected by minor formal mistakes, such as
the statement that Article 136 (3) TFEU entered into force on 1 January 2013 (p.
11), which it did only on 1 May 2013. The Bundesbank’s independence was not
enshrined in constitutional law, that is right, but it was not a “myth” (p. 29), but
guaranteed by statute (§ 12 Bundesbankgesetz 1957). The Swedish position on
monetary union (p. 47) is different from the British one as Sweden does not benefit
from an exception  in the Maastricht Treaty (and therefore is in breach of the law for
not joining the euro). The fact that the authors chose to put forward their ideas in the
shape of an essay rather than an in-depth scholarly analysis – may explain some
omissions in the referenced literature  (where is Barry Eichengreen in the sketch of
monetary history leading to EMU, where is Christoph Herrmann, the brave defender
of the ECB, and also Jean-Victor Louis and René Smits do not make an appearance
beyond a few references to recent articles). And can we really be satisfied by the –
necessary, of course! – disentanglement of “theorists, often lumped together as neo-
liberals” from Eucken to Hayek in a brief footnote (no. 41 on p. 42)?
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Finally, there are passages where Tuori and Tuori clearly let their political conviction
win over consistent argumentation: “In conflicts with the economic constitution,
the social constitution has usually been the loser…” (pp. 9, 38), even „the eternal
loser“ (pp. 231 et seq.). Really? And if so, why? Are some measures of the EU
in Greece perhaps unconstitutional? What is the role of institutions such as the
European Committee of Social Rights in the crisis? The Tuoris could easily have
quoted their compatriot Matti Mikkola for a deeper analysis. Of course, conditionality
may lead to severe social hardship (p. 134) – but what if the Member States and EU
institutions had allowed default to take place in Greece in early 2010? The hardship
suffered by Greece now would have been inflicted by Greece’s private creditors
claiming back their money or interrupting the flow of fresh loans. Did the EU Member
States  take up the blame from private creditors in providing support to the States in
need?
No doubt the subject is complex, the density of existing analyses is overwhelming.
And yet scholarship must strive for more coherence and consistency than political
“incrementalism” (p. 266) can ever achieve. While Tuori and Tuori rightfully
criticize the incremental reactions to the crisis they do not manage to provide the
reader with a comprehensive picture of the relationship between economics and
constitutionalism in times of crisis. Of course, it cannot be expected from European
legal scholarship that it provides a blueprint of how to proceed after the crisis and
to give us a roadmap out of the crisis. Despite their interdisciplinary efforts, legal
scholars are not vested with the methodology to do so. But the law has clearly a role
in economic governance. What we need is a comprehensive, if not holistic view on
the “structural coupling” between law and economy mentioned above. Stability has
many facets. We should detect them before becoming too pessimistic as scientists.
In this respect further research is needed.
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